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Introduction
Recently there has been growing academic interest in the ways in 
which emerging information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) are changing family practices and relations. Particular focus has 
been given to the potential detrimental and/or beneficial effects of 
these technologies on family functioning across different dimensions, 
including family communication and cohesion; family roles, rules and 
intergenerational conflicts; relationship formation; intimacy patterns; 
and work‒home and family boundaries (Arnold, 2004; Bittman et al, 
2004; Carvalho et al, 2015; Hertlein, 2012; Hughes and Hans, 2001; 
Jamieson, 2013; Lanigan, 2009; Lanigan et al, 2009; Mesch, 2006; 
Nansen et al, 2009, 2010, 2011; Wajcman et al, 2008, 2010). There 
has been additional interest in how these effects vary according to 
age, gender, social class and nationality (Cuban, 2017; Lim, 2016). 
Underlying these studies are particular theoretical conceptualizations 
of the relationship between technological and social change, which 
implicitly or explicitly frame the specific ways in which ICTs are 
understood to relate to family dynamics. For example, ICTs might be 
seen as driving changes in family life or, conversely, family members’ 
intentional uses of technologies can be understood as mediating their 
effects. In this chapter we examine how the technology‒society relation 
has been theorized and consider how this has influenced research on 
ICTs and family life. We begin by outlining four conceptual approaches 
to understanding the relationship between technology and society. 
The first three – ‘technological determinism’, ‘social constructivism’, 
and ‘actor network theory’ – have left a clear mark on the field, while 
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Connecting families?
the fourth, ‘posthumanist’, perspective is emergent and results from a 
recent ‘posthumanist turn’ associated with feminist studies of science 
(see Barad, 2007).1 Drawing on recent research, we then go on to 
illustrate how these approaches inform theoretical and empirical 
investigations of ICTs and family life. We conclude by suggesting that 
these theoretical formulations are important resources through which 
people, families, organizations, governments, educational systems, 
the media, and much more, experience and make sense of the role of 
technology in contemporary life, and devise interventions accordingly.
Theoretical perspectives on technology and society
Technological determinism
Technological determinism is a way of thinking about the relationship 
between technological and social change that informs academic, policy 
and popular accounts about the place of technology in everyday life 
(Marx and Smith, 1994; Wyatt, 2008). Its foundations are generally 
traced back to the work of Karl Marx and his historical materialist 
analysis of the role of technology in labour processes.2 Technological 
determinism is not a unified approach.3 However, it is possible to 
discern some common principles.
Technological determinism conceptualizes technology as hard 
material objects. As Marx and Smith (1994, pp x‒xi) explain, 
‘technology is conceived in almost exclusively artefactual terms, and 
its materiality serves to reinforce a tangible sense of its decisive role 
in history’. This understanding is present in Marx’s definition of the 
machine as ‘a mechanism that, after being set in motion, performs 
with its tools the same operations as the worker formerly did with 
similar tools’ (Marx cited in MacKenzie, 1984, p 486). The idea of 
technology as a material artefact makes it possible to conceptualize it as 
an ‘autonomous force or entity that is independent of social processes’ 
(Marx and Smith, 1994, p xi). As Wyatt (2008, p 168) further explains, 
the assumption is that ‘technological developments take place outside 
society, independently of social, economic, and political forces’. 
Moreover, these developments are understood to follow a particular 
teleological trajectory which is sequential in nature and which in turn 
prescribes ‘a necessitous path over which technologically developing 
societies must travel’ (Heilbroner, 1967, p 336). Elaborating on Marx’s 
classical example of the move from the hand- to steam-mill, Heilbroner 
(1967, p 336) notes how ‘the steam-mill follows the hand-mill not by 
chance but because it is the next stage in a technical conquest of nature 
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Theoretical perspectives on technology and society
that follows one and only one grand avenue of advance’. Importantly, 
this trajectory is seen as naturally given, with its own logic, rationale 
and law-like properties. Technological determinism, then, is ‘a view of 
history in which human will has no real role – in which culture, social 
organization and values derive from laws of nature that are manifest 
through technology’ (Bimber, 1994, p 99). In this account, technology 
stands in as a proxy for nature, which determines history and culture, or 
provides the material constraints within which human agency and will 
are exercised. As Heilbroner (1994, p 69) notes, ‘Machines make history 
by changing the material conditions of human existence’. Heilbroner 
(1994) argues that the ‘acquisitive mindset’ – which he defines as human 
economic behaviour or the principle of ‘maximizing’, and which he 
sees as a fundamental ‘rule’ or ‘law’ of behaviour in societies – is the 
‘mediating mechanism’ through which technology acts as the primary 
causal agent in history and social change.
Social constructivism
Social constructivist approaches to technology were developed in the 
1980s in direct reaction to some of the assumptions underpinning 
technological determinism, and as an extension of a broader social 
constructivist movement in the social sciences (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966). Examples of such approaches include ‘social shaping of technology’ 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985), ‘social construction of technology’ 
(also known as SCOT) (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) and ‘technological 
systems’ perspectives (Hughes, 1987). Social constructivist approaches 
contest the key assumption underpinning technological determinism 
that technology is an independent, exogenous and autonomous 
entity or force that drives social change. Authors such as Pinch and 
Bijker (1984) and Grint and Woolgar (1997) challenge the essentialist 
notion that technologies have inherent features that determine their 
nature, use and effects. They suggest that the attributes, workings 
and successes of technologies are not derived from their internal 
characteristics but rather from the broader sociopolitical contexts in 
which they are designed, developed and adopted. In his account of 
SCOT, Sismondo (2010, p 98) illustrates this with the example of the 
watch, which he suggests can be ‘simultaneously constructed to tell 
time, to be attractive, to make profits, to refer to a well known style 
of clock, to make a statement about its wearer, etc.’. He furthermore 
explains that even the practice of telling the time serves multiple 
purposes such as keeping time, measuring length of time, or recording 
the timing of an event. Given this diversity of use, he contends that 
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‘there is no essence to a watch. And if the watch has no essence, then 
we can say that it has systematic effects only within a specific human 
environment’ (Sismondo, 2010, p 98). The argument then is that 
the social contexts in which technologies are designed and taken up 
determine their nature and effects. Consequently, the development and 
use of technology are understood as negotiated and contingent social 
processes rather than reflections of some inherent, natural, internal or 
teleological trajectory and logic. Bringing a feminist perspective to 
social constructivist accounts, Wajcman (2010), for example, argues 
that gender identities and power relations influence the development, 
design and use of domestic and workplace technologies. Equally, she 
suggests, ‘our relationship to technology is integral to the constitution 
of subjectivity for both sexes’ (Wajcman, 2010, pp 144‒145). In this 
sense, technology and gender can be seen as mutually shaping one 
another. Another example comes from Pinch and Bijker (1984), who 
suggest that there is nothing inevitable about the development of the 
modern bicycle. Its design and uptake, they argue, is not due to its 
intrinsically superior design compared to rival models. Rather, it is the 
result of a negotiated process involving competing interpretations (what 
they call ‘interpretive flexibility’) by different ‘relevant social groups’ of 
what bicycles are, and of their purposes, problems and solutions. The 
eventual form of technological artefact that is stabilized – the modern-
day bicycle in this example – emerges through a process of ‘closure’ 
in which certain interpretations of the bicycle, and the solutions that 
it is seen to provide to specific problems, come to be accepted. As 
Sismondo (2010, p 98) puts it, ‘the development of technologies is 
the result of rhetorical operations, defining the users of artefacts, their 
uses, and the problems that particular designs solve’. On this account, 
the success of the artefact is not dependent on its effective design; 
rather, it is the very success of the artefact that allows us retrospectively 
to claim some designs as more effective than others. While social 
constructivist approaches consider technology to be a ‘sociotechnological 
ensemble’ (Bijker, 1995) in which the social and the technical interact 
and mutually shape one another (MacKenzie, 1984), priority is given to 
human actors and their intentional meaning-making processes (Pinch, 
2010). Technologies might shape and influence human actions, but 
ultimately human actors are the main locus of agency and drivers of 
sociotechnical change.
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Theoretical perspectives on technology and society
Actor network theory
Actor network theory (ANT) approaches to technology and society 
are both a continuation of, and a break from, social constructivist 
accounts. They continue to see technology as embedded in social 
relations and processes. However, they try to overcome the separation 
between technology and society by rejecting the notion that these are 
two separate, yet interacting and mutually shaping, spheres. In this 
regard they are trying to move beyond both technological determinism 
and social constructivism. ANT rejects both the idea that technology 
is a given fixed material entity that drives social change, and the 
notion that technology is simply a socially constructed effect. Instead, 
ANT conceptualizes technologies, social institutions and relations as 
comprised of both material and cultural elements. As Latour (1991, 
p 110) argues, ‘We are never faced with objects or social relations, 
we are faced with chains which are associations of humans and non-
humans’. Or, in Law’s (1992, p 381) words, the material and the social 
are nothing other than networks of heterogeneous elements. Callon 
(1986) illustrates this point through the example of the electric car. 
On his account, the existence of this ‘technical object’ is reliant on 
the construction of ‘its concomitant actor-world’, understood as a 
combination of many associated and heterogeneous entities including 
‘consumers, social movements and ministries… accumulators, fuel 
cells, electrodes, electrons, catalysts and electrolytes’ (Callon, 1986, p 
22). ANT therefore takes as its starting point these networks of human 
and nonhuman ‘actants’ (Latour, 1994) and investigates how these 
sociotechnical assemblages are established and their relational effects. 
Importantly, this approach seeks to treat the human and the nonhuman 
in a symmetrical way as equal participants in the world, refusing to 
privilege one over the other. For instance, in his example of the gun 
and the gunman, Latour (1994) draws attention to the way in which 
human and nonhuman actants are brought together in specific actions 
in which they share and exchange their properties, and are thereby 
modified to become ‘someone else, the hybrid actor composed… of 
gun and gunman’ (Latour, 1994, p 33). Latour therefore redistributes 
actions within human‒nonhuman or sociotechnical networks: ‘action 
is a property of the whole association, not particularly of those actants 
called humans’ (Latour, 1994, p 36). Callon and Muniesa (2005, p 
1236) further illustrate this point in their analysis of economic markets 
as dependent on ‘distributed calculative agencies’. As they argue, these 
agencies ‘are not human individuals but collective hybrids’, where 
‘knowledge and action are never individual’, but ‘distributed between 
humans and nonhumans’, including – in the case of financial markets 
page 25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
26
Connecting families?
– such tools as double-entry bookkeeping or computer assisted trading 
systems (Callon and Muniesa, 2005, pp 1236‒1237). ANT is therefore 
sometimes conceptualized as grounded within a ‘relational materialist’ 
ontology, which is regarded as one of its distinctive features compared 
to other versions of materialism within sociology (Law, 1992). As well 
as rejecting the dualist tendency to treat the material and the social 
(and related binaries such as agency/structure and micro/macro) as 
essentially different, ANT treats all kinds of entities ‘people, machines, 
“ideas” and all the rest – as interactional effects rather than primitive 
causes’ (Law, 1992, p 389). Agency is therefore located with interactions 
of heterogeneous elements, and the capacity of these elements to 
modify each other through their associations. On this account, reality 
is made up of sociotechnical networks which continuously reconstitute 
themselves and are therefore the prime agents of change. As Law (1992, 
p 389) suggests, ‘to the extent that “society” recursively reproduces itself 
it does so because it is materially heterogeneous. And sociologists that 
do not take machines and architectures as seriously as they do people 
will never solve the problem of reproduction’.
ANT seeks to treat nonhumans (the technological) and humans (the 
social) symmetrically and refuses to accord analytical importance to the 
difference between the nonhuman and the human (Law, 2009, p 147). 
Its key theoretical concern is to extend agency to nonhuman entities 
in the same way that humans have been granted agency. To engage 
in this project, it necessarily designates (and therefore differentiates) 
various actants in the world as either ‘nonhuman’ or ‘human’ in order 
to consider how these come together in heterogeneous networks. 
For instance, in Latour’s (1994) example of the gun-and-gunman 
‘collective’, the gun is taken to represent the ‘nonhuman’ while the 
gunman stands for the ‘human’ element. Similarly, in Callon’s (1986) 
study, the production of the electric car is seen as dependent on an 
assemblage of elements that are described as ‘human’ (for example, 
consumer markets, social movements, ministries) or ‘nonhuman’ 
(for example, accumulators, fuel cells, electrodes, electrons, catalysts 
and electrolytes). ANT conceives itself as a ‘posthumanist’ project 
(Law, 2009, p 147) in that it seeks to dismiss ontological differences 
between human and nonhuman actants, thereby allowing their equal 
participation in the world. This is just one specific understanding of 
‘posthumanism’. In the section that follows, we discuss a distinctive 
posthumanist approach in which the key focus is not so much on how 
to eradicate analytical distinctions between the nonhuman and the 
human, or the technological and the social, but rather on understanding 
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how nonhuman and human entities, and the divisions between them, 
come into being.
Posthumanism
A number of feminist science studies scholars, such as Haraway, Barad, 
Suchman and Castañeda, are putting forward alternative ‘posthumanist’ 
approaches to understanding the relationship between technology and 
society. Whereas ANT investigates how technology and culture come 
together in heterogeneous human‒nonhuman networks to produce 
reality, these feminist authors are interested in the ontologically prior 
question of how ‘technology’ (‘the nonhuman’) and ‘culture’ (‘the 
human’) come to be constituted as ontologically distinct entities and 
domains in the first place (Barad, 2007; Castañeda and Suchman, 2014; 
Haraway, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2008, 2016; Suchman, 2007). It is 
in this sense that we consider these approaches to be ‘posthumanist’, 
following Barad’s (2007, p 136) understanding of posthumanism as ‘the 
practice of accounting for the boundary-making practices by which 
the “human” and its others are differentially delineated and defined’.
On this posthumanist approach the project of understanding the 
relationship between technology and society consists in investigating 
how it is that ‘the technological’ and ‘the social’ come to be configured 
as separate and separable. No a priori dualistic distinctions are made 
between technology/society, nonhuman/human, object/subject, 
nature/culture, and so on. Rather, the nature of the world is taken 
to be ontologically indeterminate outside of specific practices. As 
Haraway (1997, p 62) explains: ‘The bifurcated categories themselves 
are reifications of multifaceted, heterogeneous, interdigitating practices 
and their relatively stable sedimentations, all of which get assigned to 
separate domains for mainly ideological reasons’. Importantly, these 
practices (for example, those that constitute the division between 
‘technology’ and ‘society’) are also conceptualized in a non-dualist way 
as ‘material-semiotic’ (Haraway, 1988) or ‘material-discursive’ (Barad, 
2007). Crucial here is the specific conceptualization of materiality and 
discourse as mutually constituted and articulated. The former is not seen 
as a fixed substance, or an inherent property of independently existing 
objects, but rather as referring to ongoing processes of materialization; 
while the latter is not considered as synonymous with language, but 
as constituting ‘the material conditions for making meaning’ (Barad, 
2007, p 335). Just as discursive practices are always already material 
(they are an ongoing materialization of the world), so too materiality 
is discursive: material phenomena come into being through, and are 
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inseparable from, discursive practices. As Barad (2014, p 175) explains: 
‘Meaning is not an ideality; meaning is material. And matter isn’t 
what exists separately from meaning. Mattering is a matter of what 
comes to matter and what doesn’t’. Material-discursive practices, then, 
dynamically enact specific objects, meanings and boundaries that are 
constitutive of the world.
Posthumanist approaches focus neither on the ways in which 
technology and society mutually shape one another, nor on how 
technology and society come together in relational networks that 
include interacting heterogeneous elements. Rather, they investigate 
how the entities ‘technology’ and ‘society’, ‘nonhuman’ and ‘human’, 
and the boundaries between these, are dynamically produced and 
reproduced through historically, culturally and materially contingent 
and specific material-semiotic practices. Suchman (2007) illustrates this 
approach through her work on human‒machine relations. She explores 
the development of ‘humanlike machines’, also known as ‘humanoid, 
android, social, and personal’ robots (Castañeda and Suchman, 2014, 
p 316) as fertile ground for investigating the ways in which human/
nonhuman and social/technological entities and boundaries are 
constituted. For example, she shows how these artificial intelligence 
robotics projects already enact the human/machine binary, as they seek 
to develop and study ‘models of human intelligence by constructing 
them on a physical robot’ (Menzel and D’Aluisio, 2000, p 58, cited in 
Suchman, 2007, p 235). The starting point of these projects is that there 
exist certain qualities, attributes and capacities (such as intelligence, 
the ability to interact with the environment, embodied sensory‒motor 
interactions, learning through interaction, sociality, development) that 
are understood to be essentially ‘human’, and that these can be grafted 
onto what is regarded as ‘nonhuman’, inert and inorganic matter. 
Suchman’s point is that these robots are not so much bringing together 
human/social and nonhuman/technological properties and capabilities. 
Rather, the development of these robots, and their underpinning 
dualist assumptions, are actively implicated in the very constitution 
of human/nonhuman and social/technological entities and binaries.4 
On this posthumanist understanding of the relationship between the 
human/social and the nonhuman/technological, agency resides neither 
with one of these binary terms, nor with their interacting associations, 
but rather with the materialization and making of these binary entities 
and boundaries. On this approach, both ‘persons’ and ‘machines’ are 
understood ‘as entities achieved only through the ongoing enactment 
of separateness and always in relation with others’ (Suchman, 2007, 
pp 257‒258), where this relation with ‘others’ is understood as 
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‘intra-active’ (Barad, 2007, p 33). Barad’s concept of ‘intra-action’ 
is key to understanding the relationship between the social and the 
technological that is being proposed by posthumanist approaches. 
Unlike ‘interaction’, which assumes the existence of separate individual 
agencies prior to their relation, ‘intra-action’ recognizes the inherent 
inseparability of entities from one another and from the specific 
practices and relations in which they are constituted. Entities do not 
pre-exist these practices and relations, but are their constitutive effects. 
Therefore, on a posthumanist account, the world makes and remakes 
itself through dynamic materializations of differences – such as the 
human/society and nonhuman/technology distinction – where these 
differences and boundaries are open to ongoing reconfiguration.
These distinctive theoretical perspectives on the relationship between 
technological and social change provide important conceptual resources 
for studies investigating interactions between ICTs and family life. 
In the following section we explore how the first three positions 
(technological determinism, social constructivism and actor network 
theory) have implicitly or explicitly shaped empirical research on 
ICTs and family life, and we outline possibilities for using the fourth, 
posthumanist, approach as a framework through which to investigate 
this problematic.
Implications for research on ICTs and family life
Technological determinism
While few studies explicitly align themselves theoretically with 
technological determinism, many carry deterministic overtones in their 
concern with the specific effects that ICTs have on different aspects 
of family life. One example is research conducted by Lanigan and 
colleagues (Lanigan, 2009; Lanigan et al, 2009) in which they explored 
the impact of home computer use on family communication, cohesion 
and adaptability. Results from their online survey indicated that: 
Most participants (68%) said computer use increased their 
sense of connection to friends and family, resulting in 
improved communication and cohesion. One third said 
e-mail encouraged more frank communication, which was 
perceived as good for the family. Family time increased due 
to efficiencies gained through computer use. The computer 
was seen as an enticement to keep children home as well 
as a source of mutual interest, interaction, and tool to plan 
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family activities. Several respondents used the computer to 
pursue education, enhance personal growth, and support 
important life roles such as spouse or parent. (Lanigan, 
2009, p 603)
Their conclusion is that ‘The computer altered adaptability by 
functioning as a change agent’ (Lanigan, 2009, p 603). The relationship 
between ICTs and the family is conceptualized in a deterministic 
way to the extent that the computer is understood as an autonomous 
material device carrying inherent ‘technology characteristics with the 
potential to influence family usage patterns’ (Lanigan, 2009, p 597). 
These properties of technology include accessibility (user friendliness 
and convenience of use), scope (multifunctionality), obtrusiveness 
(physical properties and pervasiveness), resource demand (financial 
cost) and gratification potential (fashion, style and entertainment of 
the ICT in question) (Lanigan, 2009). By virtue of these fixed and 
given features, technology is seen as providing ‘alternative means of 
fulfilling existing family functions and needs’ (Lanigan et al, 2009, p 
27), thereby affecting the ways in which families operate. It is in this 
sense that technology is understood to act as a key ‘change agent’.
Social constructivism
Wajcman’s research on the role of ICTs on the work/home boundary 
is an example of a social constructivist approach to conceptualizing 
the relationship between technology and society (Wajcman, 2008; 
Wajcman et al, 2008, 2010). This project is a continuation of her 
pioneering work in science and technology studies challenging 
technological determinism (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985), and 
of her longstanding interest in theorizing the interaction between 
gender and technology (Wajcman, 1991, 2004, 2010; Bittman et al, 
2004). In this recent research, Wajcman and her colleagues reject the 
technologically deterministic notion that ‘people have little control 
over the effects of technology and must largely accept its impact’ 
(Wajcman et al, 2010, p 258). Instead, they are interested in exploring 
‘user decisions about the way they incorporate the Internet in their 
daily lives, specifically in relation to the purpose – be it for work or 
personal purposes – and time of use’ (Wajcman et al, 2010, p 259). In 
their discussion of Australian households’ use of ICTs to manage the 
division between work and home, they emphasize that people are not 
passively accepting the capacity of technologies to blur temporal and 
spatial boundaries between these two spheres. Rather, they are ‘actively 
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making decisions about how they incorporate the technology into their 
lives in ways that are beneficial to them’ (Wajcman et al, 2010, p 271) 
and that allow them to manage work and home life. For example, while 
some employees in their study interpreted the internet as ‘a tool that 
may assist them to attend to personal matters while at work’ (Wajcman 
et al, 2010, p 270), or – on the other hand – as ‘a work extension 
technology’ (Wajcman et al, 2010, p 270), most participants appeared 
to maintain the boundary between work and family life, despite 
the specific technical capabilities, or affordances, of the technology 
to connect work and home. This study is an illustration of a social 
constructivist approach to the relationship between ICTs and family 
to the extent that it rejects the notion of technology as a determinant 
of family life and work‒home boundaries and conceptualizes it as the 
effect of human intentional actions and interpretations.
Actor network theory
Actor network theory is a further theoretical resource for researchers 
studying interactions between ICTs and family life. For example, 
Arnold, Davis, Gibbs and Nansen (Arnold, 2004; Nansen et al, 2009, 
2010, 2011) draw on insights from ANT and material culture studies 
in sociology, anthropology and cultural geography to explore the 
proliferation and use of ICTs in domestic and familial everyday life 
in Australian homes. Their interest is in developing a ‘symmetrical 
approach to the study of home life through analysis of the physical 
encounters and cultures formed within the home – the entanglements 
of spaces, objects, and subjects’ (Nansen et al, 2011, p 694). Their 
research considers the ways in which people, domestic architectures 
and material artefacts – including ICTs – ‘are materially and temporally 
woven together to constitute the particular kind of place called home’ 
(Nansen et al, 2011, p 694). Consequently, they treat the social and 
the material, the human and the nonhuman, and the social and the 
technological as mutually shaped emergent ‘sociotechnical phenomena’ 
(Arnold, 2004, p 185) rather than separate entities. A major focus 
of their work is the agency of technologies, which they argue ‘are 
not simply neutral tools, but active participants in constructing the 
familial, the organisational, and the social’ (Nansen et al, 2010, pp 
139‒140). For example, they explore how technology-mediated 
practices shape domestic rhythms and the temporal organization and 
experience of contemporary life. They argue that family routines and 
schedules are inflected by new technologies through their involvement 
in everyday practices (Nansen et al, 2009). Importantly, they locate 
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agency not simply with ICTs and their affordances but rather with 
their interactions with domestic and family life (Nansen et al, 2010, p 
147). In this sense technology is neither an agent of change in family 
practices and relations, nor is it a passive tool that is simply domesticated 
by human actors (Arnold, 2004, p 185). Rather, technology has effects 
through its participation in networks of domestic practices, architecture 
and material artefacts (Nansen et al, 2011).
Posthumanism
On the posthumanist approach that we outlined above, the study of the 
relationship between ICTs and the family entails a way of doing research 
that takes neither ‘ICTs’ nor ‘the family’ as already constituted entities, 
but rather sees these domains, and the separation between them, as 
dynamically constituted through historically, culturally and materially 
contingent and specific material-semiotic practices (Mauthner and 
Kazimierczak, 2014). These include, among others, technology design, 
development and marketing; family practices, relations and ideologies; 
government policies and legislation around technology (surveillance, 
privacy, trust, safety and security), family and work‒life balance; 
organizational policies and practices around technology, family and 
work‒life interactions; educational policies and institutions; notions 
of childhood including their intersection with conceptions of nature 
and its role in child development; and various public discourses on 
these matters, including the media, popular culture and academia. A 
posthumanist study could focus on one or several of these aspects. The 
important point is that it would specifically investigate and account 
for how practices across these various domains are implicated in the 
constitution of the boundary between ICTs (the technological) and 
family (the social). Our earlier discussion of the different theoretical 
conceptualizations of the relationship between technological and 
social change (technological determinism, social constructivism and 
actor network theory), as well as our outline of the empirical studies 
above, are examples of how academic practices have been involved in 
(re)producing the ICT/technology and family/society binary. Our 
argument is that a posthumanist study of ICTs and family life is one 
that accounts for the constitution of these entities (and their separation), 
rather than assuming that these entities are pre-existing starting points 
for the investigation. On this posthumanist approach, agency lies with 
multiple historically, culturally and materially contingent and specific 
practices that materialize ‘ICTs’, ‘family’ and the separation between 
them.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have highlighted the links between specific studies 
of ICTs and family life and broader conceptualizations of technological 
and social change present in social theory. In doing so, we want to 
emphasize that what is at stake in these empirical projects is not only 
the issue of how families are shaped by, engage, form networks, or come 
into being with ICTs. Rather, embedded in these investigations, and 
the theoretical perspectives that underpin them, are more fundamental 
assumptions about the nature of the world, and how it is made and 
sustained. For technological determinism, it is the laws governing 
technological developments and human behaviours that act as causal 
mechanisms driving the world forward. Social constructivism, on the 
other hand, positions human intentional actions as the main locus of 
change. ANT conceptualizes the world as produced and reproduced 
through operations of heterogeneous sociotechnical networks. On a 
posthumanist account, the world makes and remakes itself through 
dynamic materializations of difference – such as the distinction between 
technology and society – where these differences and boundaries are 
open to ongoing reconfiguration.
These distinctive approaches have implications for how we 
conceptualize the nature of time and its relation to technological, 
social and family change. On our reading, the first three perspectives 
all treat time as an ontological given, but differ in their understanding 
of how time relates to technological and social change and progress. 
Technological determinism takes time as a fixed external parameter 
and backdrop against and within which transformations unfold. The 
future both temporally and causally follows from the past according 
to a teleological trajectory that promises ever-increasing progress, 
knowledge and understanding. Social constructivism conceptualizes 
change as an effect of human meaning-making processes. Here, the past 
can only be understood through a present that renders it meaningful, 
and progress is attributed retrospectively. Actor network theory rejects 
the notion of progress understood as inevitable movement from a less 
developed and informed past to a more advanced and enlightened 
future. Instead, it suggests that the direction of change proceeds from 
complexity to ever-increasing complexity in the form of entangled 
networks (Latour, 1998, 2004). A posthumanist perspective, as outlined 
in this chapter, does not treat time as a pre-existing container or marker 
of ‘what already is’ (Barad, 2007, p 430). Rather, it conceptualizes time 
as constituted with social, technological and family change. While this 
approach rejects a teleological notion of progress, it nevertheless retains 
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a version – albeit reconfigured – of causality. In this understanding of 
causality, distinctions between cause and effect, past and future, are not 
taken as given but rather as relational outcomes of dynamic processes 
of materialization through which other binaries such as society/
technology are constituted. This means that, for instance, technological 
developments, social change and family practices across the life course 
are not seen as separate and pre-existing phenomena, each unfolding 
over time independently of, but in interaction with, one another. 
Instead, the posthumanist proposal is that technology, society and the 
family intra-actively (re)constitute themselves dynamically not through 
time but together with time.
The theoretical formulations presented in this chapter and their 
conceptualizations of technology, society, family and time are important 
because they provide resources through which people, families, 
organizations, governments, educational systems, the media, and much 
more, make sense of the role of technology in contemporary life, and 
devise interventions accordingly. For example, while technological 
determinism is one of the most critiqued ways of understanding 
the technology/society relationship, this perspective nevertheless 
underpins many popular and policy accounts of how technology has 
changed society, as well as everyday experiences of technology (Marx 
and Smith, 1994; Wyatt, 2008). It is in this sense that, as Suchman 
(2007, p 1) suggests, the ways in which the ‘human‒machine’ relation 
is configured matter and have material-semiotic effects because they 
provide possibilities for seeing, imagining, intervening and indeed 
making the world.
In brief
1. Underlying studies of ICTs and family life are particular conceptualizations 
of the relationship between technological and social change, which frame 
how ICTs are understood to relate to family dynamics: ‘technological 
determinism’, ‘social constructivism’, ‘actor network theory’ and 
‘posthumanism’.
2. Technological determinism views the laws governing technological 
developments and human behaviours as causal mechanisms driving 
the world forward. This perspective informs studies in which ICTs are 
understood as autonomous material devices carrying inherent properties 
which influence family life.
3. Social constructivism rejects the assumption that technology drives social 
change and gives priority to human actors and their intentional meaning-
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making processes. This entails conceptualizing ICTs as effects of human 
actions and interpretations, rather than as determinants of family life.
4. Actor network theory conceptualizes heterogeneous sociotechnical 
networks (rather than either technology or humans) as prime agents 
of change. ICTs are seen as having effects through their participation in 
networks comprising family members, technological artefacts, domestic 
practices and the material home.
5. Posthumanism regards the world as constituting itself through dynamic 
materializations of difference, including the technology/society 
distinction. This approach investigates and accounts for how practices 
across various domains are implicated in the constitution of the boundary 
between ICTs and family.
Notes
1 The authors and approaches included within each of the four perspectives are not 
unified in their understanding of the relationship between technology and social 
change. However, their conceptualizations share some key common principles and 
characteristics which warrant grouping them together.
2 There are different interpretations as to whether Marx’s work constitutes a 
technological determinist account of history (Bimber, 1990; Heilbroner, 1967, 
1994; MacKenzie, 1984).
3 See Marx and Smith (1994) for a discussion of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions of 
technological determinism.
4 There are other practices and projects that are also implicated in the making of 
these boundaries, for example, developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, 
etc (Castañeda and Suchman, 2014; Suchman, 2007).
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